There are more than 2.5 million miles of oil and gas pipelines in the USA. Government regulations require that buried or submerged petroleum pipelines be externally coated and cathodically protected if installed after July 31, 1971. As demands shift, or oil and gas fields are depleted, pipelines can be mothballed, to maintain integrity in the interim, or permanently abandoned. When pipelines are removed from service, the environment must be safeguarded from residual product and potentially hazardous contaminants that may remain in the pipeline. Recently, procedures have been developed in order to safeguard the environment from the hazards associated with abandoned pipeline structures. Natural force damage (which includes weather, among other naturally occurring events) was attributed to 9% of incidents involving hazardous liquid pipelines from 2002 to 2003. On-shore pipelines are typically buried at depths where ambient soil temperature is relatively constant, and above freezing. However, it is common for portions of pipelines to be aboveground, for example at meter stations, or at crossings. Consequently, aboveground pipelines are subject to ambient air temperatures. This paper provides a case history in which a failure analysis was used to determine the metallurgical cause of a failure involving a mothballed hydrocarbon pipeline that was exposed to freezing temperatures.
Background
A metallurgical analysis was performed on a section of a pipeline that ruptured while out of service. The pipe was located above grade, over a ditch that was approximately 7.5 m wide. The failure was discovered during maintenance activities along the right of way and occurred in a portion of the world that regularly experiences freezing temperatures in the winter. The time of the year/season that the failure occurred is not known.
The portion of the pipeline containing the failure was comprised of 50.80 cm diameter by 0.792 cm wall thickness, API 5L X42 line pipe steel with an electric resistance welded (ERW) longitudinal seam. The pipeline was installed in 1971 and protected with an impressed current cathodic protection (CP) system. The aboveground portion of the pipeline at the failure location was externally coated from the 9 to 3 o'clock orientation with a paint coating. The pipeline was in operation for two periods of time, 1971-1980 and 1995-1997 , and was mothballed (likely pressurized with nitrogen) since 1997. The mothballed pressure at the time of rupture was not provided. The objectives of the analysis were to determine the metallurgical cause of the failure and identify any contributing factors.
Approach
The following steps were performed for the analysis. The pipe section was visually inspected and photographed. A portion of the pipe section that contained a feature at the failure origin was removed from the pipe section, and the fracture surfaces were photographed. Magnetic particle inspection (MPI) was performed on the external pipe surface at the feature to identify crack-like indications. A fracture surface sample was removed and cleaned with ENPREP Ò 214, examined with a stereo light microscope at low magnifications, and examined in a scanning electron microscope (SEM) at high magnifications to document the fracture morphology. A metallographic cross section was removed from across the fracture surfaces at the failure origin, mounted in epoxy, polished, and etched. Light photomicrographs were taken to document the feature morphology and steel microstructure. Vickers (10 kg load) hardness testing was performed on the mounted cross section removed from the failure origin. Chemical analysis was performed on a sample removed from the base metal of the pipe section to determine the steel chemistry. Mechanical testing (duplicate tensiles and full Charpy Vnotch [CVN] impact curves) was performed on specimens removed from the base metal of the pipe section.
Results and Discussion
Optical Examination Figure 1 shows a photograph of the pipe section, as received. The pipe section was 7.39 m in length and contained the rupture opening. A reference girth weld (RGW) was located at the upstream (U/S) end of the pipe section. Flow direction and top dead center were marked on the pipe section. The total length of the rupture opening extended axially from 0.02 to approximately 5.75 m (5.73 m long) downstream (D/S) of the U/S RGW and circumferentially from approximately the 3:30-6:00 o'clock orientations (90°). The figure shows the rupture path forked near the end of the rupture opening. Note that the length of the rupture opening was only approximately 2 m less than the span of the ditch. The rupture opening had a consistent width of 0.02 m, and the maximum width of the rupture opening was slightly larger at a gouge located 4.60 m D/S of the U/S RGW. The width of the opening was very thin, which would be atypical for a pipe containing nitrogen (compressible gas), suggesting that water may have been present in the pipeline at the failure site. Since the failed pipe section was located over a ditch, it may have been a low point on the pipeline where water could collect.
The seam weld was located at the 12:30 o'clock orientation, 40 cm counterclockwise (looking D/S) of the failure origin described below. Coating was present on approximately 50% of the external pipe surface (on the top of the pipe section). No coating was present adjacent to the failure origin. There was no evidence of internal corrosion of the pipe section. Figures 2 and 3 show photographs of the external surface of the pipe section at the likely failure origin, as received, and after MPI, respectively. The failure origin was identified based on the fractography discussed below. The figures show a gouge located within the boundaries of a dent. The dent was approximately 15 cm in axial length and 9 cm in circumferential length, with a maximum depth of 0.33 cm (0.65% of the outside diameter [OD]). The gouge was located in the base metal at the failure origin. The gouge was approximately 16.5 cm in axial length, was located circumferentially on either side of the rupture opening, and had a width of 4.9 cm. The external corrosion, in the form of pitting, was present along the length of the rupture opening. The greatest wall loss along the rupture opening was 0.13 cm (16.7% of nominal wall thickness [NWT]). No crack-like indications were identified on the surface of the gouge or surrounding metal.
The circumference and wall thickness of the pipe section were measured at the cuts ends of the pipe section. The circumferences of the pipe section were both 160 cm (calculated diameter of 51.0 cm). Table 1 shows the wall thickness values. The thickness values were between 0.759 and 0.787 cm, with an average value of 0.772 cm. The wall thickness values of the pipe section are consistent with a NWT of 0.792 cm. Figure 4 shows a photograph of the fracture surface following removal from the pipe section. Chevron markings are present on the fracture surface (also drawn in gray) and converge from the U/S and D/S directions at the gouge/dent location. Chevrons are macroscale-nested ''V''shaped ridges, and the apex of the V's points to the fracture initiation [1] . The orientations of the chevron markings in the photograph indicate that the fracture initiated at the gouge.
Scanning Electron Microscopy Figure 5 shows an SEM image of the fracture surface at the gouge/dent and origin of the rupture. The figure shows two regions on the fracture surface delineated by a red dashed line. Region 1 is at an oblique angle with the free surface, OD surface breaking, and 0.76 mm deep (10% of NWT). Region 2 appears to be fairly perpendicular with the free surface and rougher than Region 1. Region 2 is the remainder of the fracture surface. Region 1 is the surface of a re-rounding crack, and Region 2 is the portion of the fracture surface that failed during the rupture event.
Figures 6 and 7 show high-magnification SEM images of the fracture surface in Regions 1 and 2, respectively. Region 1 consists of the re-rounding crack located in the gouge. Figure 7 shows that Region 2 contains cleavage facets, which indicate brittle (overload) failure. Region 2 shows the overload that occurred during the rupture event.
The presence of the cleavage facets indicates the rupture likely occurred below the ductile brittle transition temperature (DBTT). Figure 8 shows a light photomicrograph of the mounted cross section (Mount A) that was removed from the gouge/dent and origin of the rupture opening. The fracture surface of the rupture opening at this location is somewhat curved near the OD and inside diameter (ID) surfaces, and relatively perpendicular to the free surfaces in the midwall region. The microstructure of the steel is somewhat lighter near the OD surface compared to the remainder of the steel, consistent with mechanical damage. Figure 9 shows a light photomicrograph of the fracture surface at the gouge in cross section. The dashed, yellow line in the figure indicates the approximate interface between Regions 1 and 2. Region 1 is approximately 0.8 mm deep (10% of NWT), at an oblique angle with the free surface, has a darker appearance than Region 2, and is the re-rounding crack. Figure 10 shows a light photomicrograph showing the interface between Regions 1 and 2. Region 1 is composed of elongated grains, and Region 2 is composed of nondistorted grains. Figure 11 shows a high-magnification light photomicrograph showing the microstructure of Region 1 near the OD surface. The figure shows that the microstructure in Region 1 is composed of elongated grains of pearlite (dark area of lamellae) and ferrite (white areas) grains. The elongated grains indicate cold working that occurred during the formation of the gouge/re-rounding crack. The discoloration shown in Fig. 8 is due to the altered microstructure. 
Metallographic Examination
Hardness testing was performed on Mount A at the locations shown in Fig. 9 (at hardness locations A-E); see Table 2 for results of the testing. The hardness in the darker portion of Mount A (Region 1) was between 222 and 247 HV (715 and 796 MPa equivalent ultimate tensile strength [UTS]), while the hardness in the lighter portion of Mount A (Region 2) was somewhat less, between 156 and 173 HV (511 and 562 MPa equivalent UTS) [2] . The higher hardness measured in Region 1 is consistent with the cold worked microstructure observed in the region.
Mechanical Testing
The results of the tensile testing for the pipe section are shown in Table 3 . The yield strength (YS) and UTS for the base metal were determined to be 313 MPa and 411 MPa, respectively. The base metal YS meets the minimum YS requirement of 290 MPa, and the UTS is slightly lower than the UTS requirement of 414 MPa, for API 5L Grade X42 line pipe steel.
Charpy V-notch impact testing was performed on 10 base metal specimens. An analysis of the base metal data indicates that the 85% fracture appearance transition temperature (FATT) is 62°C and upper shelf Charpy energy is 55 N m, full size. There is no Charpy energy requirement in API 5L for this vintage of line pipe steel; these values are typical for this vintage and grade of line pipe steel.
The CVN test results can be adjusted to determine the 85% FATT that would be expected for full-scale pipe by applying temperature shifts to the data [3] . This method (full scale) adjusts the 85% FATT obtained from the Charpy tests to a predicted FATT from the Battelle drop weight tear test (BDWTT). The predicted 85% FATT from the BDWTT test most closely represents the expected FATT for full-scale pipe wall material [4] . The full-scale brittle to ductile transition temperature for the sample, based on a pipe wall thickness of 0.792 cm, is 60°C; see Table 4 . Based on this analysis, the tested materials are expected to exhibit ductile fracture behavior above 60°C, for full-scale pipe [3] .
Chemical Analysis
The results of the chemical analysis performed on a sample removed from the pipe section are shown in Table 5 . The results of the analysis indicate that the base metal sample meets the specified requirements for API 5L X42 line pipe steel at the time of manufacture. Burst Pressure and Leak/Rupture Analysis CorLAS TM was used to estimate the burst pressure based on the measured mechanical properties of the pipe section, nominal pipe properties, and the dimensions of the flaw (gouge and re-rounding cracks) on the fracture surface. The measured YS and UTS of 313 MPa and 411 MPa, respectively, were used for analysis. The overload region consisted of brittle fracture, indicating lower shelf CVN impact behavior. Using the lower shelf impact energy of 3.25 N m, the predicted failure pressure (J fracture toughness criterion) was 11 MPa (118% of the specified minimum yield strength [SMYS]), which is much greater than a typical pressure for a mothballed pipeline (0.1 MPa [1atm]). The CorLAS TM model does not account for the dent geometry or residual stresses associated with the dent and therefore may overestimate the failure pressure. It is also possible that the steel underwent strain age embrittlement as a result of the dent and gouge, which would reduce the local toughness and the estimated failure pressure. CorLAS TM was used to estimate the burst pressure for a defect-free pipe with the same measured tensile properties and pipe dimensions. The predicted burst pressure of a defect-free pipe using flow strength criteria is 12 MPa (132% of SMYS). CorLAS TM and Surflaw were used to back-calculate the minimum pressure that the pipeline could have been operating at to produce a running fracture. The measured mechanical properties of the base metal and the pipe geometry were used for the burst pressure calculation. The back-calculated operating pressures using CorLAS TM and Surflaw were 2 MPa (27.5% of SMYS) and 3 MPa (38.2% of SMYS), respectively. This suggests that the pipe was pressurized to a minimum of 2 MPa in order for it to have resulted in a running fracture outside of the dent.
Conclusions
The results of the analysis indicate that the rupture initiated at an axially oriented flaw, located within the boundaries of a dent in the base metal. The preexisting flaw consisted of a gouge and re-rounding crack on the OD surface. The rupture propagated along the length of the pipe in a brittle manner for 5.7 m. Leak/rupture length calculations suggest that the pipe section was pressurized to a minimum of 2 MPa (27.5% of SMYS) in order for it to cause a running fracture outside of the dent. Since it is unlikely that the pipe would have been pressurized with nitrogen to 2 MPa, it is possible that water was present at the time of failure and that freezing caused the pipeline to rupture. This hypothesis is consistent with the narrow rupture opening.
Below is a summary of our observations and conclusions:
• The rupture occurred in the base metal, away from the seam weld, and extended 5.7 m. The rupture opening was approximately 2 m less than the span of the ditch. • The rupture opening was very narrow, which is atypical for a rupture of a pipe containing a pressurized gas or liquid. • Mechanical damage was observed on the pipe section at the rupture opening in the form of a gouge within a dent. • The dent was approximately 15 cm in axial length and 3.3 mm (0.65% of OD) in depth. The gouge had a depth of 0.79 mm, approximately 10% of the NWT. • A re-rounding crack was located in the gouge at the failure origin; it had a depth of 0.79 mm, approximately 10% of the NWT. • External corrosion, in the form of pitting, was present along the length of the rupture opening. The greatest wall loss along the rupture opening was 1.32 mm (17% of NWT) at a location near the failure origin. • There was no evidence of internal corrosion.
• The hardness and microstructure (elongated grains) of the gouge are consistent with cold working/mechanical deformation. • The hardness and microstructure of the base metal away from the mechanically deformed region are consistent with this vintage and grade of line pipe steel. • The pipe steel chemistry and tensile properties, except for the UTS of the base metal, meet the composition and tensile specifications for API 5L X42 line pipe steel at the time of manufacture. • The measured ultimate tensile strength of 411 MPa for the base metal is slightly below the specified minimum value of 414 MPa. 
